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ABSTRACT

This paper is the record of a debate between Don Hellison, representing "humanism" in physical education, and Daryl Siedentop, representing "behaviorism." The paper contains a statement from each speaker, followed by each man's rebuttal. In his first statement, Hellison presents his image of humanity, emphasizing the human need to feel competent, develop a subjective belief system, and be consciously self-aware in a manner which is both reflexive and creative. Hellison contends that, translated into practice, the self-reflexive capacity of humans requires exposure, self-awareness education, and choice. Siedentop, replying to Hellison, disagrees that values arise spontaneously from within as an expression of the individual's inner nature. He contends that all behavior is determined, but need not be determined by coercive forces. Arguing that Hellison is implying that the quest for the growing competence of the individual cannot be accomplished through behavioral techniques, Siedentop outlines research at Ohio State University which concerns teaching preservice educators how to maximize student learning probabilities in a lowing manner beneficial to student growth and development. In their rebuttals, Hellison embellishes on his remarks about self-control and Siedentop tries to define the difference between their opposing views. (JA)



HUMANISM AND BEHAVIORISM IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION

A DIALOGUE

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Hellison (First Statement)

What I would like to share with you this morning is my image of man (or humanity) and the relationship of this image to the conduct of physical education.

Whether or not my perspective is humanistic depends on one's definition of that elusive term. The concept of humanism has divergent roots - in the Renaissance man concept promoted by the <u>Humanist</u> magazine, in the Emerson-Thoreau-Whitman tradition, and more recently in the humanistic psychology movement led by Maslow and Rogers who, as Daryl has pointed out elsewhere, operate from somewhat different concepts of self (Siedentop, 1974). Since I am not comfortable being identified as part of one school of thought or a particular movement, I won't attempt to define or defend humanism (this is known as the old soft shoe). Instead, I will just briefly describe my thoughts, beliefs, and even my feelings about the connection between physical education and my image of man.

First, there are some assumptions which are particularly crucial since a behaviorist will be scrutinizing these remarks. For me, evidence or data from which to theorize or philosophize or, more importantly, to conduct programs is not limited to research in the traditional sense or even to empirical observations but include my own, as William James put it, conscious experience (McDonagh, 1973). I trust my feelings while at the same time (hopefully) recognizing their subjectivity. More broadly, the whole business of searching for the truth (but not the truth itself) is a subjective process, as Michael Polanyi has suggested (to the extent that I understand Polanyi) (Polanyi, 1958; Polanyi, 1964). In fact, searching for the truth is a value itself and the process is value-laden. This limitation, if it is perceived as such, does not bother me but does require all of us to discuss our biases and assumptions to the extent that we are aware of



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ambiguous at best about focusing on observable results, not only because much of what I am interested in is not "very" observable but more importantly because the cause-effect model (including modifications of that model) is based on a concept of man which states that both man's inner and outer behavior can be predicted according to certain cause-effect laws.

I want to sketch the important dimensions of my image of man and to connect each of these as we go along to the conduct of physical education.

The first of these is man's seemingly universal need to maintain and enhance his self - the need to feel competent. A second dimension of the self which is intimately related to this need is that each person develops a uniquely subjective belief system about himself consisting of his experiences, his biological potentials and limitations, and his values and aspirations in his life. How competent a person feels about himself, as well as his efforts to meet his need to feel competent, are mediated by this belief system so that each individual perceives uniquely and acts uniquely. This is not all there is to man, but to the extent that it is true there are implications for the conduct of physical education.

The implications are these: if this basic need to feel competent is not met, students will either "shut down" or spend their entire "PE life" struggling to, or rationalizing to, enhance their feelings of competence. This need provides a base of support for all else that happens in physical education. It might be an easy matter (or at least not an insurmountable one) to ensure such a base of support if, for example, a comfortable environment and opportunities for success could be reduced to a reinforcement schedule or some kind of environmental guarantee to meet this need. But the individual belief system of each student requires, it seems to me, something more, something difficult to attain



and next to impossible to accurately measure, and that is a genuine positive relationship between student and teacher. We can't truly get inside someone else and understand and empathize completely due to the uniqueness of each individual's belief system, but we can be genuinely concerned about that student, we can respect that student as a person, we can make every effort to understand his behavior and be sensitive to his needs, we can be honest, open, and really ourselves in our dealings with each student. For me, focusing on the relationship rather than the results more closely fits man's complex belief system and is more likely to meet his fundamental need to feel competent.

Beyond the need to feel competent and the subjective belief system, I would argue that man possesses a conscious self-awareness which is both reflexive (the ability to choose from among alternatives, to reflect on one's own behavior) and creative. This is a giant step beyond what we have already said and needs to be elaborated.

First, this awareness is a capacity, not necessarily a reality. Just because many of us are influenced to a considerable extent by our environment does not mean that we don't possess this capacity. A key may be whether we perceive ourselves to possess this capacity. As Brewster Smith has suggested, if a person perceives himself to be a pawn jerked around by his environment he will probably behave that way, whereas a person who perceives himself to be an agent of change in his own life is more likely to behave according to this perception (Smith, 1973).

Second, I am not very clear about the creative dimension of this selfawareness. I am convinced that it exists, but I don't know wheter it is part of
one's awareness or, as some psychologists have argued, part of the unconscious.
Either way, I am sure that there is more to man than his biological potentials and
his experiences; I think man can "rise above" his experiences both by reflecting



on them and by creating. I'm not going to say much about the implications of creativity for the conduct of physical education, because I haven't thought about it that much, except to note that creativity can be encouraged not only through movement exploration and modern dance but by utilizing self-expressive and problem-solving activities in other areas of physical education as well.

Third, self-awareness is part of a growth process, and therefore stages of development need to be considered in any application of this concept. It may be that young kids or the trainable mentally retarded have a limited self-awareness capacity. It certainly has been well-documented that people do go through a number of stages of development, and the earlier stages do not appear to contain much in the way of a developed self-reflexive capacity. I'm not prepared to argue this point except to state that the effort to realize each individual's self-awareness potential at his particular stage of development is a major goal in physical education for me.

Translated into practice, the self-reflexive capacity requires exposure, self-awareness education, and choice.

By exposure I mean not only to a wide range of activities but to both a wide range of meanings and approaches to learning as well. Meanings are very private and therefore cannot be categorized very well, but activity can be competitive or non-competitive, playful or work-oriented (your "production schedule"), winning is everything or "hit and giggle" (with a can of beer in one hand and a badminton racquet in the other), health-oriented or risk-taking, and so on. Approaches to learning now range beyond the command style and rolling out the ball to encompass behavior modification techniques, the Gentile model (Gentile, 1972), various forms of individualized instruction, and so on.

By self-awareness education I mean discussing, in groups and individually, such things as becoming an agent of change in one's own life, awareness of one's



own needs and interests and potential talents, stages of development in relation to the individual, the variety of meanings possible in activity, and so on.

Perhaps this kind of education ought to be done somewhere else, but it is not being done, particularly with regard to physical education.

By choice I don't necessarily mean an open gym (although that's not such a bad idea sometimes); I mean giving students a chance to exercise some choice in activities, in meaning, and in approaches to learning, depending on such factors as their stage of development and available facilities.

Finally and briefly, my image of man includes valuing both as a process and a product. It seems to me that values both come from within man - "arise spontaneously in human beings as an expression of their intrinsic nature" (Manas, January 23, 1974, p. 1) - and "grow [to have] a life of [their] own" (Drews and Lipson, 1971, p. 22) as well from which people can pick and choose. Both because I have placed emphasis on students choosing and because, as Ulrich has suggested (Ulrich, 1968), physical education perhaps has more interaction and more affective activity than other aspects of the curriculum, I would include in the conduct of physical education both values clarific tion (which involves such things as choosing from alternatives and identifying the sources of one's values) and the introduction of people-centered values such as sensitivity toward others and perhaps even love.



Siedentop (First Statement)

Dr. Hellison has decided not to define humanism, a choice which recurs with amazing regularity in discussions such as this. It is a wise choice, because to define is to limit and to limit is to exclude, and nobody, neither Don nor I, wants to be excluded from the ranks of the humanists. I would be remiss, however, if I did not use this opportunity to define the behaviorist position. I am of course talking mostly about Skinnerian behaviorism, because it is that brand of behaviorism that has received widespread publicity and criticism in recent years, and it is Skinnerian tradition that has produced the fields of behavior amodification and applied behavior analysis.

Ten to fifteen years ago critics (Freudians and humanists) were saying that behavior really couldn't be modified in any real sense--that any change in "surface" behavior would replace the one that had been modified. Well, we are several hundred thousand modifications later without any symptom substitution, and critics now say that they know that behavior can be changed, but it shouldn't be changed. In fifteen years "you can't" has changed to "you shouldn't."

Critics such as Joseph Wood Krutch, Noam Chomsky and Carl Rogers have their counterparts in physical education. Coaches such as Darrell Mudra (1970), professional giants such as Jack Cratty (1970), and young humanists such as Hal Lawson (1974) have in their own ways said "you shouldn't." Therefore, I think it important to place the behaviorist position in perspective, and then later to describe my views of how it might contribute to a humanistic physical education.

Let me begin by describing to you what behaviorism isnit ...

Behaviorism does not mean that we walk around having stimuli elicit behavior from us; i.e., it is not Pavlovian--it does not suggest a 1 to 1 invariant relation-ship between the individual and his environment--it isn't bond formation or paired



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responses or any kind of physicalist connectionism--indeed, the only people who have described it in this manner in the past 40 years are critics who have not bothered to take the time to learn about it.

Behaviorism does not inherently produce a set of stilted, artificial, phony relationships—a behavior modification program is inherently no more nor less phony than an encounter group—behavioral techniques used poorly are no better nor worse than humanistic techniques used poorly.

Behaviorism does not deny personal responsibility. It may look at questions of morality and ethics from a slightly different perspective, but, when a child misbehaves, the behaviorist does not set out to immediately change the environment which produced the misbehavior—rather, he first sets out to modify the behavior pattern of the individual, and that surely supports the notion of personal responsibility.

Behaviorism is not Walden II - one should not confuse the substantial scientific contributions of Skinner, which have been largely methodological, with his 19th century, agrarian value structure.

Behaviorism does not deny mental events, or private behavior or feelings--

"Man is said to differ from other animals mainly because he is 'aware of his own existence.' He knows what he is doing; he knows that he has had a past and will have a future; he 'reflects on his own nature;' he alone follows the classical injunction 'Know thyself.' Any analysis of human behavior which neglected these facts would be defective indeed. But self-observation can be studied, and it must be included in any reasonably complete account of human behavior. Rather than ignore consciousness, an experimental analysis of behavior has stressed certain sciousness. The question is not whether man can know himself but what he knows when he does so." (Skinner, 1971, p. 190)

That is B. F. Skinner speaking in the last chapter of Beyond Freedom and Dignity.

Behaviorism does not ignore the product while focusing on the process--both are important--since behavior is indeed the subject of interest that accusation seems particularly indefensible.

Finally, behaviorism does not inherently emphasize quietness of children, docility in students, and uniformity in human behavior - no fair estimate of the current research could result in that conclusion - the current research is as likely to promote inquisitiveness, exuberance and diversity.

Those are some things that behaviorism isn't!

Perhaps now I can begin to describe some of the essential elements of the behaviorist postion and in doing so raise some point of contention with Don. I must say that my points of contention will be directed mostly to his view of man and what it implies. His prescription for practice is well stated, and, if he



would allow for some real skill development to enhance the individual's growing sense of competence, it would begin to sound more than a little similar to the prescription I advocate in Physical Education: Introductory Analysis. (Siedentop, 1972)

Without question, the first point that must be made is that the behaviorist is a determinist. Not a 1 to 1, invariant, physicalist determinist of the Pavlovian type but nonetheless a determinist. Put simply, this means that all behavior has a cause and there is no such thing as uncaused behavior. Being a determinist, the behaviorist does not react adversely to the concept of behavior control, a concept which tends to mark the occasion for humanists to roar and rage. For the behaviorist, there is no such condition as "no control." One might discuss good control versus bad control. One might talk about immediate artificial control where the controlling variables are highly visible as opposed to intermittent natural control where the environmental variables exerting the control are seldom visible. One certainly might discuss coercive versus positive control. Many are interested in the growing science of selfcontrol. However, the question of no control is to the behaviorist a pseudoissue. It is a myth. And, it is a dangerous one because it discourages us from examining potential agents of control. Therefore, when Don suggests that values arise spontaneously from within as an expression of some inner nature, I would have to disagree. What a person values is the result of his genetic uniqueness and the uniqueness of the environmental histories to which he has been subjected.

What I am denying of course is the traditional concept of autonomous man...
of behavior that has no cause outside the individual or cannot be traced to a
history of genetic or environmental influences. If by freedom, we mean that inner



man can autonomously decide for himself how he will behave independent of all genetic and environmental influences, then the behaviorist must quarrel with that concept. Behavior is primarily determined by the consequences it generates in the environment and this is true whether the consequences are planned by another human or generated spontaneiously as the human interacts with an unplanned environment. However, if by freedom we mean that each of us faces choice situations and that the goal should be to make those decisions according to our own unique histories of experience, without coercion from a direct controlling agent, then most certainly man can and should be free.

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The essential difference here is in viewing freedom as a concept of natural law or man made law. If you can distinguish between natural and man made law, then freedom and determinism are never opposing forces. In natural law the opposite of determinism is not freedom; it is chance or randomness. In man made law the opposite of freedom is not determinism; it is coercion. All behavior is determined but behavior need not be determined by coercive forces. Indeed, the history of man's struggle has been to free himself from coercive political, economical and religious forces.

Therefore, if decision making, choosing and valuing are specific goals for Dr. Hellison, he values them because of his unique history of experience. Having valued them as educational goals, a behaviorist would set about to teach them. In decision making, for example, it would be important for a student to weigh the consequences of his various alternatives; to learn the difference between immediate and deferred consequences; to explore the many environmental factors that through his unique history have come to motivate him; to differentiate those consequences that while proving to be reinforcing to him might promote behavior that proves harmful to others around him; and to come to grips with the



kinds of choices that are normally reinforced in the subculture within which he has grown and lived.

In terms of the basic assumptions of behaviorism there is another point of contention that I might raise with Don. It is important for an understanding of the behavioral movement but it is also important because it tends to raise again that old spectre of "you can't." When I hear Don dichotomizing subjectivity against objectivity, when I hear him talk about valuing being outside the realm of science or when I hear him quote William James about consciousness as opposed to empiricism and/or research, I hear again "you can't."

The world of feelings and subjective valuing is an important world. Don is certainly correct when he suggests that the "facts" and our "perceiving" or "valuing" of those facts may be two different matters. If psychology has told us anything in the past 50 years, it most certainly has told us that the personal characteristics and history of the observer tend to affect the observations he makes. Likewise, Don is also correct when he suggests that there are problems of observability connected to feelings and valuing. A fact and what a person feels about a fact are different but this does not mean that the latter cannot be viewed as another fact and studied.

"The problem arises in part from the indisputable fact of privacy; a small part of the universe is enclosed within a human skin. It would be foolish to deny the existence of that private world, but it is also foolish to assert that because it is private it is of a different nature from the world outside. The difference is not in the stuff of which the private world is composed, but in its accessibility." (Skinner, 1971, p. 191)

It does bother me to have implied that this inner world is of a different order and therefore can't be amenable to the same principles which affect behavior in the public world. It bothers me precisely because it takes us away from an examination of that private world and it tends to do so in the name of personal



freedom, allowing us to cling to that traditional concept of autonomous man. However, the future will show the degree to which this concept is useful. Unlike Washington politics, this is one area where solution by announcement will not hold up. As Donald Baer has said:

"If the causes of our behavior are there to be managed, and certainly they will be managed, then we might still consider ourselves free as long as we remain ignorant of those causes and how they are being managed in our own case. If you understand behavioral control, you may detect its application to you and defend yourself ainst that application...Thus, freedom in this sense requires not only an appreciation of behavioral laws and technology; it also requires the range of behavioral skills that make self-defense and self-development possible. It may seem a paradox, but it is not, the deliberate control of learning behaviors in scnool and elsewhere, in fact may maximize that person's freedom...Thus, the inital program, if properly conducted, deliberately develops chose behaviors that will undermine its own power to continue control—or any single source's power to control. This surely is one meaning of freedom."

(Baer in Sulzer and Mayer, 1973)

Don's goal of growing competence for the individual is a worthy one. I think he is right when he suggests that it provides the base of support for all that happens in physical education. I also agree that loving can and should be a part of physical education. Students should learn to love activity and teachers need to learn how to love students. Don is also correct when he says that all of this can't be reduced to a schedule of reinforcement. Of course, no behaviorist has ever said that it could be so reduced and the real implication of Don's statement is that matters such as these can't be accomplished through behavioral techniques or within the behaviorist framework. I think he is wrong.

There has been a consistent tendency in progressivist/humanistic education to dichotomize process and product--or relationships and results as Don calls them. Such a dichotomy tends to play relationships and results against one another with an inevitable value judgment as to their relative importance. Don indicates clearly that he values relationships more than results. I think that cheats the student. I think it is counterproductive to the goal of a growing sense of competence.



I think it "" I likely that concept and value of self--how we feel about ourselves--is amined primarily by how people react to us. How people react to us is largely determined by what we can do and how we behave. People do not react to the "inner us"--they react to the "outer us." Value of self in a physical education setting is determined to a large degree by how well we can perform and how well we perform is a public matter that is acknowledged by peers and others who share the experience. I consider it crucial to students' growing sense of competence that they become skilled--skilled in ways that are recognizable, skilled in ways that count--to themselves and to those around them. To neglect these "results" in the name of good human relations is a mistake.

The Rogerian emphasis on therapeutic skills for teaching--his list of qualities for a good teacher is virtually identical to his list of qualities for a good therapist--and therapeutic goals for education have led part of the humanistic education movement to disregard education achievement, be it in reading or in physical education. Some leading humanistic educators, such as Jonathan Kozol and Mario Fantini, have recognized the danger in this trend. Kozol says that many free schools fail because kids don't learn how to read. Skinner says the free school is no school at all. They are both right. Like Summerhill, most free school models are based on Freudian or Rogerian models that make sense as therapeutic environments but not as educational environments.

The humanist's contention that warm human relationships are more important than educational achievement sets up a false hierarchy of values and even tends to imply that you can't have both. I am convinced that relationships and results are inalterably entwined. I believe that McLuhan's "medium is the message" is a truism that recognizes the inseparability of process and product. Robert Mager, whose penchant for brevity and clarity has made his book on instructional objectives a classic in education, puts it well when he says that the universal



objective of all education should be for students to learn to like what they are learning as they are learning it.

Mager, of course, is a behaviorist. He believes that we can understand the conditions under which students learn to love or hate a subject matter. I am a behaviorist and I believe that preservige teachers can be taught how to arrange learning environments so that students become competent and, also, how to interact with those students in a loving way. I know that Don does not believe that teaching can be reduced to a set or responses that can be passed on in a major curriculum and I do not pretend to understand fully the complex nature of relationships between students and teachers. However, complexity should not deter one from doing what one can and in our research at The Ohio State University we think we are beginning to understand the rudiments of teaching preservice physical educators how to maximize the probabilities that student will learn and to do so in a loving manner that will prove beneficial to the student's growth and development as a productive human being.

We are starting with some very basic rules of behavior and some fairly discreet yet broadly conceived classes of teacher and student behavior. Interestingly, Mario Fantini (1974) has recently discussed the humanistic education movement in terms that describe perfectly our major goal of "reshaping the negative environments which victimize the full growth of human beings."

Our data clearly show that preservice physical educators produce strongly negative learning environments. In terms of general student behavior they tend to react exclusively to behavior that they consider to be inappropriate. With many interns we can observe for 3-5 weeks without ever recording a single instance of a positive reaction to an appropriate student behavior. In interacting during skill practice they tend to react to errors in student performance. All in all, their interactions hinge almost entirely on what students do wrong. The ratio of



negative to positive interactions ranges from 5-1 for a fairly good candidate to 25-1 for some real hardnoses. Many emit negative interactions at a rate of 5 per minute. This does not mean that they are always yelling at or chiding students, although there is a lot of hassling going on. It means simply that they react consistently and at a high rate to what students do wrong. Obviously, this is not the best strategy to enhance the student's growing sense of competence.

We have found that we can change the general pattern of interaction dramatically in a short period of time. We now have a sequence of interventions that will eventuate in what we consider to be a substantial improvement in interpersonal skills. All of this is done through a standard behavior modification model using cueing, goal setting, modelling and feedback. We start by reversing the negative/positive ratios. We aim for a gradual increase in the rate of positive interactions per minute and a corresponding decrease in negative interactions. Within 3-5 weeks we can almost always achieve a rate of 3.5-5.5 positive interactions per minute and reduce the negative to less than 1 per minute.

Having achieved a stable rate and ratio of positive to negative interactions, we then attempt to broaden the variety of interactions. During early modification stages most teachers fall into some standard verbal response pattern that Carey Hughley has so aptly labeled "the global good." With one teacher it might be "good job"; with another, "nice going." This next intervention sequence increases the variety of verbal interactions and also teaches the teacher to vary the quality and intensity of the delivery of the verbal praise statement.

Having achieved a sufficient variety of verbalizations, we intervene to increase the rate of non-verbal interactions. We role play, model and cue a variety of non-verbal interactions that range from a quiet pat on the back accompanied by a smile to an exuberant slapping of hands.



The next intervention in the sequence is to focus on the informational quality of the interactions. There is ample research to support our contention that a minimum of 50-60% of interactions should contain information relative to the behavior in question. When the information content achieves a satisfactory level we add a value component to the information in the praise statement. The value component is simply the reason why the specific behavior is being praised. The total range might move from saying "thanks" to "thanks for making a real effort in the game" to "thanks for making such an effort in that game; when you make that kind of effort the game is more fun for everybody."

We are now extending this sequence. We are experimenting with having a minimum of 50% of teacher/student interactions initiated by having the teacher use the first name of the student. We are concerned that teachers react positively to students about things that are not strictly "school" behaviors. We want them to respond to a new pair of shoes, a nice smile and other strictly personal matters.

In total combined with increasing the preservice teacher's skills in behavior shaping and ontingency management, this is our way of helping teachers gain the skills necessary to help students achieve competence in a loving environment.



Hellison (Second Statement)

For my rebuttal, I would like to compare what Daryl has said (or what I think he has said) to my opening remarks.

Daryl has criticized some of my assumptions, particularly my assertion that searching for the truth is a subjective, value-oriented enterprise. I would argue, again with James, that any system of thought, whether humanistic or behavioristic or whatever, is closed (McDonagh, 1973). Systems are based on certain values, certain assumptions, and they operate from these "givens."

Systems can certainly be useful, and Daryl's has been useful to me as has an "opposing" system, that of Arthur Combs, upon which the Florida studies are based (Combs, et al., 1969). But they are still selective and subjective in nature.

Daryl and I appear to have some difference of opinion not only concerning the methods to reach certain goals but the goals themselves. Let's take a look.

We are in agreement that the need to feel competent is the base of support for all else that happens in physical education. I have emphasized the relationship between teacher and student while Daryl has focused on what happens to the student (the results) which he argues implies a certain kind of relationship which in turn can be shaped, at least to some extent. To elaborate my point of view in comparison to Daryl's, how one perceives one's self in physical education is a complex and individual matter dependent not on how "people react to us" but instead on: 1) whether we value the ability under consideration; 2) how we perceive "significant others" (not all others) to react to us; and 3) how we perceive our abilities in comparison to some subjective standard we have adopted. These factors complicate anyone's self-perception beyond Daryl's assertion that the major influence is people's reaction to how well the person performs.



I never meant to suggest that the environment is nothing, for I believe that, for example, a reduction in uniform (clothing) requirements and increased opportunities to achieve some success (although this is a subjective matter as well) can be helpful in developing this base of support. But: the complexity of each individual's belief system about himself as a physical education student requires something more than these kinds of environmental opportunities and that isaconcerned, genuine, empathetic relationship between the student and one of the probable significant others in his life - his teacher. This relationship will not create full-blown feelings of competence, but it is the best chance we have of opening lines of communication, of moving toward feelings of being comfortable in the physical education setting, of exploring some things, and maybe of finding or extending one's talents or interests or meeting a need.

Concerning the improvement of the student-teacher relationship through behavior modification, I have no doubt that positive interactions, for example, are better than negative ones or that positive interactions can be increased using behavior modification. I hesitate to admit that I have counted these things on occasion when working with teachers who want to improve their teacher behavior. But I still feel that, while this kind of thing may improve a teacher's skills, it is no real replacement for genuine concern which, if it is sensed by a student, may allow for some negative feedback or for acceptance of a student where he is or for sensitivity to a student's needs or for genuine open behavior on the part of the teacher. I just don't think that these things can be "environmentalized" (although we may be able to sensitize teachers a bit as we have begun to try to do at Portland State). I tend to agree with Locke's statement at last year's convention that the act of teaching is intuitive and inexplicable (Locke, 1973) - it is an art.

This brings us to the other goals I described in my opening remarks: man's



reflexive and creative self-awareness and the valuing process as they might operate in physical education.

Daryl's concept of freedom and determinism definitely reduce what I have said about man's potentialities to a fraction of what I believe to be true. He has said that "all behavior is a product of genetic and environmental influences" although man can "self-observe" in the sense that he can "make...decisions according to [his] own unique history of experience." If I understand him correctly, I would disagree that the only "choosing" a person can do is to bring himself into line with his own genetic and environmental influences. Certainly, one's heredity imposes boundaries - one cannot choose what one cannot comprehend or perform; and one's environment likewise imposes boundaries - one has difficulty without a genuine creative act choosing what one has not been exposed to. But I think (feel, believe) that man can, within these limitations, choose from alternative activities, meanings, values, learning methodologies, whatever -I mean really choose, within the boundaries I have mentioned. This doesn't mean people aren't influenced by their past experiences, but it does mean that they can reflect on these influences and reject them, that they are not always so influenced. Behavior cannot be predicted not because we don't have the technology but because behavior is not that predictable. It is not random; it is human.

The other aspect of self-awareness, the creative capacity, does not fit
Daryl's concept very well either, at least as I understand it. To me, to create,
to bring something into being, means more than the result of genetic and environmental interaction.

Finally, there is the matter of values. Are they only a product of one's environment, or is man capable, potentially at least, of intrinsically developing values such as love, truth, and beauty? I submit that values can be developed either of these ways as well as by choice (the reflexive capacity again).

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How does all of this tie into the conduct of physical education? I emphasized the teacher-student relationship as opposed to results in my ope ing remarks but only in connection with the student's need to feel competent as mediated by his private belief system. I now see the need to extend this idea into the realm of self-awareness, creativity and value-development. Please keep in mind that I do believe in goals as well as relationships. It is just that my goals, within a broad framework, differ for each individual. Therefore, relationships, exposures, and the like make more sense to me than results.

If each student has these potentialities which go beyond genetic and environmental influences and therefore beyond scientific prediction and if we as a profession are committed to helping students find and develop these potentials in physical education (this is my goal), then I think the student-teacher relationship is crucial in and of itself. It is crucial because it paves the way for a self-discovery dialog between student and teacher which encompasses the exploration of activities, meanings, modes of learning, and values. This kind of search may lead the student inside himself to a free act of choosing or even to a truly creative act, a search which cannot be predicted and should not be controlled but rather should be nurtured by a dialog based on a relationship such as I have tried to describe. It may also be (I'm not sure about this) that if a teacher believes that these potentialities exist, believes in the possibility of a "no control" situation, believes in autonomous man, then he is more likely to behave in an open manner and not as a controller, thereby facilitating this dialog.

Finally, I would distinguish between two kinds of control: self-control and other control. Daryl's remarks began with other-control but then shifted to self-control. Concerning self-control, none of what I am saying is meant to deny the



potential of behaviorism (insofar as I understand it) for teaching all of us how to better manage our own behavior. To the extent that I understand self-control techniques, they would appear to fit well in physical education classes as part of self-awareness education to help students with decision-making as Daryl has suggested.

Concerning other-control, I worry about my right as a teacher to control someone else's behavior since I believe in the potential of "no control" and autonomous man. If there is general agreement that a particular behavior is destructive to the society or perhaps to the self, maybe a case could be made for such control. I am ambivalent even about this, partly because of my inadequate understanding of behaviorism (Daryl confused me about what behaviorism is not versus what it is) and partly because I fear what others will label as essential for everyone. Perhaps self-control is the essential, in which case we would have other-control designed to lead to, and ultimately yield to, self-control. Perhaps other-control is not so sinister as I make it out to be and could lead to improved motor skills without interrupting the self-discovery dialog. We may need another session to clarify these issues!



Siedentop (Second Statement)

I shudder to hear it said that the act of teaching is "inexplicable."

If that is true, then we are all out of business. There are explanations for teachings just as there are explanations for valuing and subjectivity. What needs to be understood is that subjectivity or subjective valuing can be studied objectively.

There are three major areas that humanists and behaviorists need to explore more fully: 1) the problem of language and definition; 2) the clarification of a view of man and the implications derived therefrom; and 3) the nature of what action needs to be taken in the world; i.e., what should we be doing with students?

These three are not of equal importance nor do they deserve equal attention. However, they are related in the sense that stating a view of man or prescribing some action program depend upon a common understanding of the words used. For example, I do not understand at all what Don means when he talks about "self-awareness potential." This is not harmful because with no sense of the term I would not try to speak to it or interpret it. However, he also talks about being sensitive to students' needs and being genuinely concerned about students. Here a problem might arise because I do have some understanding of these terms and I might use them assuming that we had a common understanding of what they mean when in actuality each might interpret them differently. I am sure that there is much in the language of behaviorism that is equally obscure and in need of clarification.

Certain words and concepts have been clarified sufficiently to know that

Don and I operate from distinctly different views of man. This clarification

helps each of us examine the degree to which our beliefs and behaviors are con
sistent. It also allows us to focus more precisely on the differences in the views



and to probe them more intensively.

For example, in the process of preparing for this session, I have come to see more clearly an aspect of the humanistic view of man that implies a position normally attributed to the behaviorist view. The behaviorist is often accused of wanting to play God. Skinner wrestled with this criticism in much of the dialogue in Walden II. Many critics use the analogy of a pupeteer pulling the strings to describe the motivations of behaviorists. I have tried to show that one way control of human behavior is not a tenable position to advocate. Whenever two human beings interact, each provides consequences for the other--each tends to affect the other. In the literature of behaviorism this is referred to as countercontrol. Countercontrol is the behavioral concept that tends to refute the Orwellian vision of 1984. Skinner has been in the forefront of trying to show that historically those groups that have no countercontrol power have been the ones most badly mistreated: the young, the elderly, prisoners, psychotics and retardates. They have been mistreated because they can provide no effective consequences to counter the mistreatment done to them by others. Behaviorists have been among the leaders in firmly establishing the notion that control over others is reinforcing and also planning systems to prevent and diminish one sided control; i.e., to provide historically mistreated groups with countercontrol skills. This hardly merits the puppeteer analogy and most certainly speaks against the notion of taking on some godlike status. Ernest Becker is not a behaviorist but he has very cogently described a position that would be consistent with the behaviorist view.

"When I got sick, I was working on a book in which I try to show that all humanly caused evil is based on man's attempt to deny his creature-liness, to overcome his insignificane. All the missles, all the bombs, all human edificies are attempts to defy eternity by proclaiming that one is not a creature, that one is something special." (Keen, 1974, p. 71)



The behaviorist says that man is an immensely complex animal but nonetheless subject to the same laws that govern all behavior. The behaviorist, in Becker's words, accepts his creatureliness. It seems to me that the humanist does not. Indeed, if as Don suggests, the human has some capacifity that is beyond his unique genetic and environmental history, then this position can also be viewed as an attempt to play God or to be godlike. Skinner spoke to this same question when addressing the notion of a creative (uncaused) capability to write a poem.

"What is threatened, of course, is the autonomy of the poet. The autonomous is the uncaused, and the uncaused is the miraculous, and the miraculous is God. For the second time in little more than a century, a theory of selection by consequences is threatening a traditional belief in a creative mind. And is it not rather strange that although we have abandoned that belief with respect to the creation of the world, we fight so desperately to preserve it with respect to the creation of a poem." (Skinner, 1972, p. 35)

Sorting out these differences is fun and, like the Darwinian revolution, the behavioral view of man will be tested and will have its day in court.

Most importantly, however, is what we do...what we do with students in schools...what we do with preservice majors. In this sense it seems to me that we must arrive at some operational definition of humanism. I think we must make judgments about what people do. Mario Fantini has recently spoken to the problem of what he calls humanizing the humanist movement—a movement to which he has contributed a great deal. He raised some interesting points and issues.

"While most humanists are aware of the problems facing mankind, this movement thus far has decided to give priority to the self. If a person's attention is turned inward, he must of necessity turn away from the outward--away from other human beings and their problems." (Fantini, 1974, p. 401)

He then goes on to pose what amounts to an operational definition of humanism.

"To state it somewhat differently, while self-study may lead to a better understanding and concern for others, there is little in the present structure of the movement that would equip caring, feeling



persons to apply their concerns to social problems. A humanist in today's world is more likely to be someone who acts, not someone who cares in isolation." (Fantini, 1974, p. 401)

Some one who acts! Someone who in Fantini's words reshapes the negative environments which victimize the growth of human beings and replaces them with positive environments. Humanists in this sense are defined not by what they say or by what view of man they support but by what they do and by how their actions effect those around them.

I enjoy debating and interacting with Don; I find it reinforcing. I do indeed disagree most basically with his view and I also think his view implies a prescription for action that is less effective in achieving his goals than would be the prescription that would follow from the behaviorist view. However, I recognize that what Don does at Portland State is important and useful. He is trying to improve the quality of professional preparation; he is trying to find ways to improve the total physical education experience for students in schools. He is against the use of punitive methods. He is trying to find ways to conduct physical education so that students value it more highly. According to the Fantini approach, this clearly places him within the boundaries of humanistic education and I am sure that he will find that comforting. To the extent that my work with students at The Ohio State University works toward and achieves these goals, I too might fall within those parameters: What Carl Thoreson (1973) so brilliantly described as behavioral humanism in the 1973 NSEE Yearbook.

May I suggest, therefore, that we spend more time labeling people on the basis of what they are doing and less on what they write in journals and books or say at conventions or meetings. If you want to label Don or me, come to Portland or Ohio State and see what we do or at least find out as best you can about the nature of our work and the degree to which it is responsible for effecting the



the kinds of changes in students, schools and teachers that you would want to judge as humanistic. Each of us would welcome that kind of test.



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